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 1 Introduction
The last decade has witnessed an intense process of consolidation in the ﬁnancial sectors of
many industrial countries. This ‘merger movement’, documented in a number of papers and
oﬃcial reports, was particularly concentrated among banking ﬁrms and occurred mostly
within national borders.1 A ss h o w ni nF i g u r e1 ,i nc o u n t r i e sl i k eC a n a d a ,I t a l ya n dJ a p a n
more than half of the banks combined forces over the 1990s.
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
As a consequence, many countries (e.g., Belgium, Canada, France, the Netherlands, and
Sweden) reached a situation of high banking concentration or faced a further deterioration
of an already concentrated sector. As can be seen from Table 1, a small number of large
banks often constitutes more than 70 per cent of the national banking sector.
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]
This extensive consolidation process raises a number of important questions, including the
eﬀects on a nation’s ﬁnancial stability. The conventional wisdom is that consolidation may
lower liquidity needs and reduce activity in the interbank market. For example, according
to the G-10 ‘Report on Financial Sector Consolidation’, ‘...by internalizing what had pre-
viously been interbank transactions, consolidation could reduce the liquidity of the market
for central bank reserves, making it less eﬃcient in reallocating balances across institutions
and increasing market volatility’ (Group of Ten, 2001, p. 20).2 However, this statement may
not survive in a moderately general model. Merging banks may either increase or decrease
their demand for reserve assets. Moreover, mergers aﬀect loan markets as well as deposit
markets, and loan market competition also aﬀects the demand for reserves.
1See, e.g., Boyd and Graham (1996), Berger et al. (1999), Hanweck and Shull (1999), Dermine (2000),
ECB (2000), OECD (2000) and Group of Ten (2001).
2The eﬀects of consolidation on interbank market liquidity are of course most pronounced in smaller
countries with national money markets, such as Denmark, Sweden or Switzerland. For example, the Swiss
banking system is now dominated by two main players. In order to moderate adverse eﬀects on liquidity,
the Swiss National Bank considerably facilitated foreign banks’ access to the Swiss franc money market.
“With this opening the inﬂuence of the main banks on the conditions in the money market was reduced.
Their share of total outstanding liquidity transactions declined from more than 80% to now around 50%”
(quote from the SNB Board Member Bruno Gehrig at the Jahresend-Mediengespr¨ ach of 8 December 2000,
see http://www.snb.ch/d/aktuelles/referate/ref 001208 bge.html; translation by the authors).
2To better understand the eﬀects of bank consolidation, we develop a model that allows
us to investigate the joint impact of mergers on credit market competition, banks’ demand
for reserves and the functioning of the interbank market. Banks raise deposits at date
0, and invest in long-term loans to entrepreneurs and liquid short-term reserves. On the
loan market banks compete in prices and retain some market power through diﬀerentiation.
Reserves are needed to cope with the uncertainty about depositors’ time of withdrawals. As
in Klein (1971) and Diamond and Dybvig (1983), deposits are stochastic as a fraction of
them is withdrawn prematurely at date 1. If deposit withdrawals (also, demand for liquidity)
exceed a bank’s reserve holdings, the bank incurs a cost to obtain from the interbank market
the liquidity needed to satisfy depositors. Thus, a bank’s demand for reserves depends on
its uncertainty about deposit withdrawals and the relative cost of reﬁnancing, i.e., the ratio
of the cost of borrowing on the interbank market in case of liquidity shortage to the cost of
raising more deposits and keeping more reserves initially. The interbank market redistributes
reserves from banks with excess reserves to banks with shortages. However, when there
is aggregate excess demand on the interbank market, the central bank must intervene to
provide the missing liquidity and smooth out ﬂuctuations in the banking system. Aggregate
liquidity supply and central bank intervention can be thought of in terms of private versus
public liquidity, in the spirit of Holmstrom and Tirole (1988). In this sense, the risk of
aggregate illiquidity and the expected liquidity needs represent the intensity with which
central banks monitor and intervene in the interbank market.
Am e r g e ra ﬀects banks’ behavior with respect to both reserve management and loan
market competition. As regards the former, the merger modiﬁes the uncertainty about
deposit withdrawals, and creates an internal money market where the merged banks can
reshuﬄe reserves. Thus, besides the typical diversiﬁcation eﬀect related to the pooling of
idiosyncratic liquidity shocks, the merger induces an internalization eﬀect, which increases
ceteris paribus the marginal value of each unit of reserves that can now be used to meet
withdrawals at any of the two banks. The demand for reserves of the merged banks balances
these two eﬀects. We ﬁnd that the internalization eﬀect is stronger when the relative cost
of reﬁnancing is low, while the diversiﬁcation eﬀect dominates and banks reduce reserve
holdings when the relative cost of reﬁnancing is high. The intuition behind this result hinges
on the relationship between the marginal value of one unit of reserves, the initial value of
3reserves and the precision with which banks can estimate the probability of needing liquidity
at date 1. The merger changes the distribution of shocks the merged banks face and makes
them less uncertain about their future liquidity needs. As a consequence, when the relative
cost of reﬁnancing is low and banks keep a low level of reserves, the merged banks increase
their reserves as they are more certain to need them at date 1. The opposite happens in case
of high relative cost of reﬁnancing. In all circumstances, however, the merged banks improve
their liquidity situation, having lower liquidity risk and expected liquidity needs. Moreover,
by lowering reﬁnancing costs, the internal money market generates endogenous ﬁnancial cost
eﬃciencies, which reduce, ceteris paribus, the anti-competitive eﬀects of mergers between
banks. These results suggest that merged banks beneﬁt from scope economies in their
liquidity management by raising deposits in two imperfectly correlated deposit markets.
This last result ﬁnds empirical support in Hughes et al. (1996), who show that banks
active in imperfectly correlated deposit markets have lower costs of controlling liquidity
risk, especially after consolidation.
Mergers aﬀect market power and therefore change both loan rates and market shares
in our imperfectly competitive loan market. As known from the industrial organization
literature, the overall eﬀect of a merger on loan rates depends on how strong the increase in
market power is relative to potential eﬃciency gains. Loan rates increase when the market
power eﬀect dominates, and they decrease when the cost eﬃciency eﬀect prevails. The
novelty here is that the merger may generate eﬃciency gains through the re-optimization of
their reserve holdings as well as through a potential reduction in lending costs.
The changes the merger induces in banks’ reserve holdings, loan competition and bal-
ance sheets aﬀect also the interbank market and aggregate liquidity. We can disentangle
again two channels. The ﬁrst one, which we denote as reserve channel, originates directly
from the changes induced in merged banks’ reserve holdings as described above. A merger
leads to higher aggregate liquidity supply and thus lower expected aggregate liquidity needs
when banks increase their reserve holdings; whereas the opposite holds when banks’ re-
serves are reduced. The second channel, the so-called asymmetry channel, relates instead to
the distribution of balance sheet sizes across banks. A merger inducing greater asymmetry
among banks increases the variance of aggregate liquidity demand, thus increasing ceteris
paribus expected aggregate liquidity needs. In contrast, mergers inducing smaller asymme-
4try reduce both the variance of aggregate liquidity demand and expected aggregate liquidity
needs. The impact of consolidation on aggregate liquidity depends on the interaction be-
tween the reserve and the asymmetry channel. In particular, whether the two eﬀects work
in the same or opposite directions depends on the size of the relative cost of reﬁnancing and
on how mergers aﬀect the asymmetry of banks’ balance sheets.
The model delivers several insights, which can be interpreted according to size of merger
and type of country or ﬁnancial system. First, mergers between large banks leading to a
‘polarization’ of the banking system with large and small institutions are more likely to lead
to higher aggregate liquidity needs than mergers involving small banks, since they increase
the asymmetry in banks’ balance sheets. This result is particularly noteworthy in light of
Table 1, which suggests that the banking sector consolidation of the 1990s may have led
to greater asymmetry in the size of banks in most industrialized countries. In particular,
in Belgium, Canada, France, the Netherlands and Sweden, the ﬁve top players enlarged
their market shares signiﬁcantly to very high levels. Second, mergers are more likely, ceteris
paribus, to increase aggregate liquidity needs in developing countries than in industrial ones,
since they induce lower individual reserve holdings in less eﬃcient markets, where banks
face higher reﬁnancing costs. Third, the eﬀects of consolidation on loan competition and
aggregate liquidity tend to be complementary in industrial countries but not in developing
ones. In fact, whereas mergers are likely to aﬀect competition and liquidity in the same
direction when the cost of reﬁnancing is low (i.e., mergers between large banks are likely to
increase both loan rates and expected aggregate liquidity needs, and vice versa for mergers
involving small banks), they always push towards larger expected liquidity needs when the
cost of reﬁnancing is high, independently of the eﬀect on loan competition. Finally, the
impact of bank mergers on reserve holdings and aggregate liquidity may depend on the
phase of the business cycle. Mergers happening in upturns may aﬀect reserves and private
aggregate liquidity more negatively than mergers happening in downturns, at least in the
short run.
Relation with the literature
Our approach to study the joint implications of bank mergers for competition, individual
and aggregate liquidity combines elements of the industrial organization literature on the
5implications of exogenous mergers under imperfect competition with the ﬁnancial intermedi-
ation literature characterizing banks as liquidity providers. As in Deneckere and Davidson
(1985) and Perry and Porter (1985), banks have incentives to merge to acquire market
power. Unlike these papers, however, in our model banks’ incentives to merge are also
driven by ﬁnancing cost advantages related to size, and in particular, by the gains from the
optimal adjustment of reserve holdings due to the presence of an internal money market.
In this sense, our paper also links the industrial organization literature on mergers with
the contributions of Yanelle (1989, 1997) and Winton (1995, 1997) on the relation between
competition and diversiﬁcation in ﬁnite economies.
The ﬁeld of research studying the role of banks as liquidity providers started with Dia-
mond and Dybvig (1983). More recently Kashyap, Rajan and Stein (2002) describe the links
between banks’ liquidity provision to depositors and their liquidity provision to borrowers
through credit lines; and Diamond (1997) discusses the relationship between the activities
of Diamond-and-Dybvig-type banks and liquidity of ﬁnancial markets. Concerning liquidity
provision by public authorities, Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) analyze the role of government
debt management in meeting the liquidity needs of the productive sector. However, this lit-
erature has not considered one of our main concerns here: The implications of imperfect
competition and ﬁnancial consolidation for private and public provision of liquidity.
Several authors have studied the rationale for an interbank market and its eﬀect on
reserve holdings. For example, Bhattacharya and Gale (1987) show that banks can optimally
cope with liquidity shocks by borrowing and lending reserves; but they also argue that
moral hazard and adverse selection lead to under-investment in reserves. Bhattacharya
and Fulghieri (1994) add that with some changed assumptions reserve holdings can also
become excessive. These authors argue that the central bank has a role in healing these
imperfections. Allen and Gale (2000) and Freixas et al. (2000) analyze how small unexpected
liquidity shocks can lead to liquidity shortages in the banking system and thus, in the absence
of a central bank, to contagious crises. We discuss how the likelihood and the extent of such
shortages vary with changes in market structure when a central bank stands ready to oﬀset
private market liquidity ﬂuctuations through monetary operations.
The paper is also related to the literature on internal capital markets. Gertner et al.
(1994) and Stein (1997) discuss the eﬃciency-enhancing role of these internal markets. While
6Scharfstein and Stein (2000) and Rajan et al. (2000) warn that they might also become
ineﬃcient if internal incentive problems and power struggles lead to excessive cross-divisional
subsidies, the empirical results of Graham et al. (2002) suggest that ‘value destruction’ in
ﬁrms is not related to consolidation, supporting the idea of eﬃciently functioning internal
capital markets. Concerning banks, Houston et al. (1997) provide evidence that loan growth
at subsidiaries of US bank holding companies (BHCs) is more sensitive to the holding
company’s cash ﬂow than to the subsidiaries’ own cash ﬂow; and Campello (2002) shows
that the funding of loans by small aﬃliates of US BHCs is less sensitive to aﬃliate-level
cash ﬂows than independent banks of comparable size. Focusing on short-term assets, we
show how the creation of an internal money market can cushion external liquidity shocks
and how it aﬀects banks’ reserve choices and banking system liquidity. We also show that
the ﬁnancing cost advantages associated with the internal money market lead the merged
banks, ceteris paribus, to be more aggressive on the loan market.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sets up the model.
Section 3 derives the equilibrium before a merger (‘status quo’). The subsequent section
characterizes the eﬀects of a merger on individual banks’ behavior; and Section 5 looks at its
implications for aggregate liquidity. Section 6 contains a discussion of the diﬀerent scenarios
for competition and liquidity eﬀects of bank consolidation. Section 7 concludes. All proofs
are in the Appendix.
2 The Model
Consider a three date (T =0 ,1,2) economy with three classes of risk neutral agents: N
banks (N>3), numerous entrepreneurs, and numerous individuals. At date 0 banks raise
funds from individuals in the form of retail deposits, and invest the proceeds in loans to
entrepreneurs and in liquid short-term assets denoted as reserves. Thus, the balance sheet
for each bank i is
Li + Ri = Di,( 1 )
where Li denotes loans, Ri reserves, and Di deposits.
C o m p e t i t i o ni nt h el o a nm a r k e t
7Banks oﬀer diﬀerentiated loans and compete on price. The diﬀerentiation of loans may
emerge from long-term lending relationships (see, e.g., Sharpe, 1990; Rajan, 1992), special-
ization in certain types of lending (e.g., to small/large ﬁrms or to diﬀerent sectors) or in
certain geographical areas. Following Shubik and Levitan (1980), we assume that each bank
i faces a linear demand for loans given by
Li = l − γ

rL
i −
1
N
N X
j=1
rL
j

,( 2 )
where rL
i and rL
j are the loan rates charged by banks i and j (with j =1 ,...,i,...,N), and
the parameter γ ≥ 0 represents the degree of substitutability of loans. The larger γ the more
substitutable are the loans. Note that expression (2) implies a constant aggregate demand
for loans
PN
i=1 Li = Nl, as in Salop (1979).
Processing loans involves a per-unit lending cost c, which can be thought of as a set up
cost or a monitoring cost. Loans mature at date 2 and yield nothing if liquidated before
maturity.
Deposits, individual liquidity shocks and reserve holdings
Banks raise deposits in N distinct ‘regions’. A region can be interpreted as a geographical
area, a speciﬁc segment of the population, or an industry sector in which a bank specializes
for its deposit business. There is a large number of potential depositors in every region,
each endowed with one unit of funds at date 0. Depositors are oﬀered demandable contracts,
which pay just the initial investment in case of withdrawal at date 1 and a (net) rate rD at
date 2. The deposit rate rD can be thought of as the reservation value of depositors (the
return of another investment opportunity), or, alternatively, as the equilibrium rate in a
competition game between banks and other deposit-taking ﬁnancial institutions.
As in Klein (1971) and Diamond and Dybvig (1983), deposits are subject to liquidity
shocks. A fraction δi of depositors at each bank develops a preference for early consumption,
and withdraws at date 1. The remaining 1−δi depositors value consumption only at date 2,
and leave their funds at the bank until then.3 The fraction δi is assumed to be stochastic.
3The fraction δi can also be interpreted as a regional macro shock. For example, weather conditions may
change the general consumption needs in a region, so that each depositor withdraws a fraction δi of his initial
investment.
8Speciﬁcally, δi is uniformly distributed between 0 and 1, and it is i.i.d. across banks.4
This introduces uncertainty at the level of each individual bank and in the aggregate. All
uncertainty is resolved at date 1, when liquidity shocks materialize.
Given the structure of liquidity shocks, each bank faces a demand for liquidity xi = δiDi
at date 1 and uses its reserves Ri to satisfy it. Reserves represent a storage technology that
transfers the value of investment from one period to the next. We may think of cash, reserve
holdings at the central bank, or even short-term government securities and other safe and
low yielding assets. (The interest rate on reserves need not be zero.) The stochastic nature
of δi means that the realized demand for liquidity xi may exceed or fall short of Ri,t h u s
introducing the need for a market where liquidity can be traded at date 1, as described more
below. Denoting as f(xi) the density function of xi, at date 0 each bank faces a liquidity
risk −the probability to experience a liquidity shortage at date 1− given by
φi = prob(xi >R i)=
Z Di
Ri
f(xi)dxi,( 3 )
and has an expected liquidity need −the expected size of liquidity shortage that needs to be
reﬁnanced at date 1− equal to
ωi =
Z Di
Ri
(xi − Ri)f(xi)dxi.( 4 )
Interbank reﬁnancing and aggregate liquidity
At date 1 an interbank market opens where banks can either borrow or lend depending
on whether they have shortages (xi <R i) or excesses (xi >R i) of reserves. We focus
on the ultra-short interbank or money market, such as the unsecured market for wholesale
deposits, where both banks and the central bank operate.5 Since in this market rates
are always in between the policy rates at which sound individual banks may receive(give)
overnight deposits from(to) the central bank (e.g., the marginal lending and the deposit
4We assume for simplicity that liquidity shocks are independent across banks, but all our results remain
valid as long as liquidity shocks are not perfectly correlated.
5The most relevant and largest ultra-short market is the overnight market, in which banks exchange
liquidity at the so-called ‘overnight’ or ‘Fed funds’ rates (e.g., bid and ask rates). Most central banks
stabilize those market rates around an ‘oﬃcial rate’ (e.g., the Fed Fund target rate in the US, and the
minimum bid rate in the euro area) by adjusting the supply of liquidity to changes in the aggregate demand.
Recent evidence indicates that central banks control overnight rates quite successfully (e.g., Carpenter and
D e m i r a l p ,2 0 0 5 ;P ´ erez Quir´ os and Rodr´ iguez Mendiz´ abal, forthcoming).
9rates in the euro area, and the rate on primary credit in the US; see, e.g., Hartmann et al.,
2001; and ECB, 2004), we assume that banks can borrow at a rate rIB a n dl e n da tar a t e
rIL, independently of the counterparty. Our focus is on the amount of public liquidity the
banking system may need.
Given the presence of aggregate uncertainty, there may be an aggregate shortage or
an aggregate excess of private liquidity on the market. An aggregate shortage of private
liquidity occurs whenever banks’ aggregate demand for liquidity is higher than the aggre-
gate supply of private liquidity represented by the sum of individual banks’ reserves, i.e.,
whenever
N X
i=1
xi >
N X
i=1
Ri.( 5 )
Denoting as Xi =
PN
i=1 xi =
PN
i=1 δiDi banks’ aggregate demand for liquidity with density
function f(Xi), we express the probability with which an aggregate shortage of private
liquidity occurs through the aggregate (or systemic) liquidity risk as
Φ = prob
Ã
Xi >
N X
i=1
Ri
!
=
Z P
Di
P
Ri
f(Xi)dXi,( 6 )
and its expected size through the expected aggregate (or systemic) liquidity needs as
Ω =
Z P
Di
P
Ri
Ã
Xi −
N X
i=1
Ri
!
f(Xi)dXi.( 7 )
The aggregate liquidity risk (6) and the expected aggregate liquidity needs (7) can then be
interpreted as measures of the degree to which the banking system depends on the public
supply of liquidity, in the spirit of Holmstrom and Tirole (1988). Formulated diﬀerently, they
are indicators of the frequency and the size of central bank operations in the implementation
of monetary policy, and more generally of the attentiveness that the central bank has to
exert to implement monetary policy and ensure the stability of the interbank market.
The timing of the model is summarized in Figure 2. At date 0 banks compete in prices on the
loan market, choose reserve holdings, and raise deposits. After liquidity shocks materialize
at date 1, the interbank market opens. At date 2 loans mature, and remaining claims from
deposits and the interbank market are settled.
10Figure 2: Timing of the model
T=0 T=1 T=2
|| |
price competition shocks δi materialize, loans mature,
on the loan market, interbank market claims are
choice of reserves, opens settled, and
deposits are raised proﬁts materialize
3 The Status Quo
In this section we characterize the equilibrium when all banks are identical. We start with
noting two features of the model. First, bank runs never occur in this model. The illiquidity
of loans together with rD > 0 guarantees that depositors withdraw prematurely only if
hit by liquidity shocks. Second, we assume that the loan market is suﬃciently proﬁtable
(diﬀerentiated) for banks to borrow in the deposit and interbank markets. So, we can
directly focus on the date 0 maximization problem.
With these considerations in mind, at date 0 each bank i chooses the loan rate rL
i and
the reserves Ri so as to maximize the following expected proﬁt, where for simplicity the
intertemporal discount factor is normalized to one:
Πi =( rL
i − c)Li +
Z Ri
0
rIL(Ri − xi)f(xi)dxi −
Z Di
Ri
rIB(xi − Ri)f(xi)dxi − rDDi(1 − E(δi)).
(8)
The ﬁrst term in (8) represents the proﬁt from the loan market, the second term is the
expected revenue from interbank lending at date 1 when the bank is in excess of reserves,
the third term is the expected cost of reﬁnancing at date 1 when the bank faces a shortage
of reserves, and the fourth term is the expected repayment to depositors leaving their funds
until date 2. Taken together, the last two terms represent bank i’s ﬁnancing costs.
For expositional convenience and without loss of generality, we set rIL = 0 and denote
rIB simply as rI. (No qualitative result depends on this simpliﬁcation, which also captures
the stylized fact that the interbank market is relatively ‘passive’ in that banks do not keep
reserves to make proﬁts, but only to protect themselves against liquidity shocks.) This
simpliﬁes (8) as follows:
Πi =( rL
i − c)Li −
Z Di
Ri
rI(xi − Ri)f(xi)dxi − rDDi(1 − E(δi)), (9)
11where the third term,
R Di
Ri rI(xi −Ri)f(xi)dxi =
R 1
Ri
Di
rI(δiDi −Ri)f(δi)dδi, indicates that if
a bank’s demand for liquidity, xi = δiDi, exceeds its reserves Ri, the bank incurs the cost
rI on each unit of liquidity needed to satisfy depositors from the interbank market. Thus,
as in Klein (1971), reserves are kept for precautionary reasons. In choosing the amount of
reserves Ri at date 0, a bank trades oﬀ the cost of satisfying the expected liquidity needs
at date 1,
R Di
Ri rI(xi − Ri)f(xi)dxi,w i t ht h ec o s trD of raising more deposits and keeping
more reserves at date 0. As a consequence, a bank’s demand for reserves depends on the
uncertainty about deposit withdrawals and on the costs incurred to borrow liquidity at date
1 and of keeping reserves initially. The more uncertain the date 1 demand for liquidity xi
and the more costly raising liquidity at date 1 (i.e., the higher rI), the higher is the demand
for reserves at date 0.
The following proposition characterizes the symmetric equilibrium in the status quo.
Proposition 1 The symmetric status quo equilibrium is characterized as follows:
1. Each bank sets a loan rate rL
sq = l
γ(N−1
N ) + csq,w h e r ecsq = c +
√
rIrD;
2. It has a loan market share Lsq = l;
3. If rI >r D,i tk e e p sr e s e r v e sRsq =
µq
rI
rD − 1
¶
Lsq,a n dr a i s e sd e p o s i t sDsq =
Lsq
q
rI
rD.
The diﬀerentiation on the loan market implies that the loan rate rL
sq exceeds the total
marginal cost csq via the mark up l
γ(N−1
N ). This decreases with both the number of banks N
and the loan substitutability parameter γ, while it increases with the level of loan demand
l. The total marginal cost includes the loan lending cost c and the marginal ﬁnancing
cost
√
rIrD, i.e., the sum of the expected cost of reﬁnancing and of raising deposits.
Equilibrium reserve holdings Rsq balance the marginal beneﬁt of reducing the expected
cost of reﬁnancing with the marginal cost of increasing deposits, as explained above, and
they are positive as long as rI >r D. We restrict our attention to this plausible case.
Reserves increase with the demand for loans Lsq and with the interbank reﬁnancing cost rI,
while they decrease with the deposit rate rD. The intuition is simple. When the demand for
loans Lsq is high, banks face ceteris paribus higher deposit withdrawals at date 1 and wish
to hold more reserves to satisfy them. Similarly, when the ratio rI
rD is high, banks prefer to
12keep more reserves initially, since this is less costly than obtaining the missing liquidity from
the interbank market at date 1. In this sense, the ratio rI
rD can be deﬁned as the relative
cost of reﬁnancing, which will help us later on to distinguish various scenarios for liquidity
eﬀects. It is a measure of how costly reﬁnancing at date 1 is relative to raising deposits and
reserves at date 0.6
Two further implications of Proposition 1 are important for comparing this equilibrium
with the post-merger equilibrium in the next section. First, using the balance sheet equality
(1), we can express equilibrium reserve holdings in terms of an optimal reserve-deposit ratio
as
ksq =
Rsq
Dsq
=
Ã
1 −
r
rD
rI
!
. (10)
Note that, whereas the equilibrium reserve holdings in Proposition 1 depend on the loan
market outcome, the reserve-deposit ratio in (10) does not. To exploit this, in what follows
we will mostly focus on this ratio. In practice, the ratios of liquid assets to customers’ sight
deposits or of liquid assets to total assets are among the most frequently used indicators
by banks to assess their own liquidity situation (see, e.g., ECB, 2002, p. 22). Second,
Proposition 1 implies the following corollary.
Corollary 1 In the status quo equilibrium, each bank has liquidity risk φsq =
q
rD
rI and
expected liquidity needs ωsq = rD
2rIDsq =
Lsq
2
q
rD
rI .
The equilibrium liquidity risk φsq and the expected liquidity needs ωsq are increasing
in the deposit rate rD and decreasing in the reﬁnancing cost rI. Banks keep low reserves
when rD is high and rI is low, because raising more deposits is expensive while borrowing
additional liquidity at date 1 is not. Thus, banks’ demand for reserves decreases with the
ratio rD
rI , and banks’ liquidity risk and expected liquidity needs increase with it.
4T h e E ﬀects of a Merger on Individual Banks’ Behavior
In this section we analyze what happens at the individual bank level when a merger takes
place. The behavior of the merged banks changes in several ways. First, they can exchange
6If r
IL > 0, the ratio would be
rIB−rIL
rD−rIL .
13reserves internally, which changes how they insure against liquidity risk. Second, this ‘in-
ternal money market’ gives them a ﬁnancing cost advantage, whose size is endogenously
determined. Third, the merged banks may enjoy cost eﬃciencies that reduce their lending
costs to β,w h e r eβ < 1. Fourth, they gain market power in setting loan rates. All these
factors aﬀect banks’ equilibrium balance sheets and, in turn, the demand and supply of
liquidity. We begin with discussing how the merger modiﬁes banks’ reserve holdings, and
then we turn to its eﬀects on costs and loan market competition.
4.1 Internal Money Market and Choice of Reserves
We note ﬁrst that the merger does not aﬀect the optimal reserve-deposit ratio of the N −2
competitors. As they have the same cost structure as in the status quo, they still choose
their reserve-deposit ratios according to (10), i.e., kc = ksq. This implies also that they have
the same per-unit ﬁnancing costs
√
rIrD as in the status quo (from Proposition 1).
By contrast, the merged banks, say bank 1 and bank 2, choose a diﬀerent reserve-deposit
ratio, because the merger modiﬁes the distribution of their liquidity shocks and also allows
them to pool their reserves to meet the total demand for liquidity. Thus, as long as the
two banks continue to raise deposits in two separate regions, the merger leaves room for
an internal money market in which they can reshuﬄe reserves according to their respective
needs. For simplicity, we assume a ‘perfect’ internal money market, so that exchanging
reserves internally involves no cost, but all qualitative results go through as long as the
internal money market is less costly than the interbank one. Proceeding in this way is
motivated by recent empirical research suggesting that internal capital markets function
relatively eﬃciently (see, e.g., Graham et al., 2002; Houston et al.,1997; and Campello,
2002).
Let xm = δ1D1 + δ2D2 be the total demand for liquidity of the merged banks at date
1, Rm = R1 + R2 be their total reserves and Dm = D1 + D2 be their total deposits. The
combined proﬁts of the merged banks are then given by
Πm =( rL
1 − βc)L1 +( rL
2 − βc)L2 −
Z Dm
Rm
rI(xm − Rm)f(xm)dxm (11)
−rD [D1(1 − E(δ1)) + D2(1 − E(δ2))].
The ﬁrst two terms in (11) represent the combined proﬁts from the loan market, with β
reﬂecting potential eﬃciency gains in the form of reduced loan lending costs, the third term
14is the total expected cost of reﬁnancing, and the last one is the total expected repayment
to depositors. The operation of the internal money market can be seen in the third term of
(11), where the total demand for liquidity, xm = δ1D1+δ2D2, and reserves, Rm = R1+R2,
are pooled together.
A preliminary step before deriving the optimal reserve-deposit ratio of the merged banks
is to understand their ‘deposit market policy’. Whether they raise equal or diﬀerent amounts
in both regions aﬀects the distribution of the demand for liquidity xm, and thus the size of
the expected cost of reﬁnancing. We have the following lemma.
Lemma 1 The merged banks raise an equal amount of deposits in each region, i.e., D1 =
D2 = Dm
2 .
Lemma 1 shows that the merged banks not only raise deposits in both regions, but they
even do it symmetrically. Choosing equal amounts of deposits in both regions minimizes
t h ev a r i a n c eo fxm and maximizes the beneﬁts of diversiﬁcation, thus reducing the expected
reﬁnancing cost. (We will come back to this point in Section 5 when studying the eﬀect of
the merger on aggregate liquidity demand.)
Given D1 = D2, the merged banks choose reserves Rm so as to maximize their combined
proﬁts in (11). Let km = Rm
Dm be the reserve-deposit ratio for the merged banks and recall
that ksq is the one for banks in the status quo deﬁned in (10). The following proposition
compares these two ratios.
Proposition 2 The merged banks choose a lower reserve-deposit ratio than in the status
quo (km <k sq) if the relative cost of reﬁnancing is higher than a threshold ρ ( rI
rD > ρ), and
a higher one otherwise.
Proposition 2 contains the ﬁrst main result of the paper indicating that the merged
banks may have a higher or a lower optimal reserve-deposit ratio than individual banks.
The result depends on the relative strength of two eﬀects:
• Ad i v e r s i ﬁcation eﬀect that reduces the probability of extreme shocks for the merged
banks;
• An internalization eﬀect consisting in the possibility to use any unit of reserves to
cover a deposit outﬂow at either of the banks that make up the merged bank. This
15increases ceteris paribus the marginal value of one unit of reserves and has a positive
impact on the demand for reserves.
Whether the merged banks choose a higher reserve-deposit ratio depends on which of
the two eﬀects dominate. Proposition 2 suggests that the internalization eﬀect dominates
when the relative cost of reﬁnancing is low, whereas the diversiﬁcation eﬀect prevails when
it is high. The intuition behind this result can be explained in terms of the link between the
marginal value of reserves, the initial level of reserves and banks’ ability to estimate future
liquidity needs.7
The marginal value of reserves depends on the amount of reserves a bank has at date
0 and on the probability it will need more liquidity at date 1. The merged banks face less
uncertainty about future liquidity needs than the individual banks, because their demand
for liquidity is more concentrated around the mean. This means that at low initial level
of reserves, a marginal increase of reserves is worth more to the merged banks than to the
individual banks who are less certain of needing more liquidity at date 1. Conversely, when
banks keep high levels of reserves, a marginal increase of reserves is worth less to the merged
banks than to the individual banks, since the merged banks know they will be less likely to
need liquidity at date 1. Whether the merged banks increase their reserve holdings compared
to before merging depends on the relative cost of reﬁnancing rI
rD. When this ratio is low, all
banks keep low reserves because reﬁnancing is not very expensive. Then the merged banks
increase their reserves relative to before merging, since they have a higher marginal value
of further reserve units. The opposite happens when rI
rD is high. In this case reserves are
high, and the merged banks value further increases of reserves less than individual banks,
because they are more conﬁdent that they will not need them.
The readjustment of the merged banks’ reserve holdings changes also their reﬁnancing
costs relative to the status quo, and we have the following.
Corollary 2 The merged banks have lower ﬁnancing costs than the competitors.
This cost advantage for the merged banks is endogenous to the model in that it is
determined not only by diversiﬁcation, but also by the optimal reserve readjustment. In
7We thank Loretta Mester for suggesting this explanation.
16this sense, this result provides a new bank-speciﬁc motive to merge, in addition to the
well-known market power and diversiﬁcation motives.
To sum up, the possibility for merged banks to estimate more precisely their liquidity
needs allows them to better assess the reserve-deposit ratio they should hold and adjust it
accordingly. Furthermore, the possibility for the merged banks to exchange reserves in the
internal money market implies that banks can beneﬁt from scope economies in their liquidity
management by raising deposits in two imperfectly correlated deposit markets. This result
is consistent with Hughes et al. (1996), who ﬁnd that banks active in imperfectly correlated
deposit markets −especially as a result of consolidation− can reduce the cost of controlling
liquidity risk by appropriately adjusting deposit collection and reserve holdings. In this
respect, our result is also related to Kashyap et al. (2002), who show that combining
the activities of lending and deposit taking produces synergies that allow banks to reduce
the volume of liquid assets that banks need to hold to satisfy their customers’ unexpected
demands. However, whereas in their paper such an advantage in providing liquidity arises as
a consequence of two imperfectly correlated markets on diﬀerent sides of the balance sheet,
in our model it emerges from two imperfectly correlated markets on the same side of the
balance sheet.
4.2 Choice of Loan Rates and Balance Sheets
We now examine how the merger modiﬁes the loan market equilibrium and banks’ balance
sheets. The eﬀect of the merger on loan rates depends on how it aﬀects banks’ market
power and cost structures. As already noticed, competitors have the same total costs as
in the status quo. By contrast, the total costs of the merged banks change. As stated in
Corollary 2, their ﬁnancing costs are lower than competitors’. Furthermore, their lending
costs reach βc, where the parameter β ≤ 1 represents the potential non-ﬁnancial eﬃciency
gains that the merger induces for granting loans. The lower the parameter β the greater
are the eﬃciency gains. The idea is to include, for example, the possibility for economies
of scale, which are often put forward by bank managers in favor of mergers and have been
questioned in the literature, as we discuss in Section 6.8
8We could also allow for β > 1, in which case the merger would even lead to diseconomies. Already the
market power of merged banks tends to increase loan rates, and β > 1 would only strengthen this eﬀect. So,
none of our results would be qualitatively altered by further generalizing β.
17The following proposition describes the post-merger equilibrium with symmetric behav-
ior within the ‘coalition’ (merger) and among competitors.
Proposition 3 The post-merger equilibrium with rL
1 = rL
2 = rL
m and rL
i = rL
c for i =3 ,...,N
is characterized as follows:
1. Each merged bank sets a loan rate rL
m =
³
2N−1
N−2
´
l
2γ +
(N−1)
2N cc +
(N+1)
2N cm,a n de a c h
competitor sets rL
c =
³
N−1
N−2
´
l
γ +
(N−1)
N cc + 1
Ncm;
2. The merged banks have a total loan market share Lm =
¡2N−1
N
¢
l+γ
(N−1)(N−2)
N2 (cc−cm),
and each competitor has Lc =
(N−1)2
N(N−2)l − γ
(N−1)
N2 (cc − cm);
3. The merged banks raise total deposits Dm = 1
1−kmLm, and each competitor raises
Dc = 1
1−kcLc;
where cm, cc are the total marginal costs of the merged banks and of the competitors,
and km and kc are their respective optimal reserve-deposit ratios.9
Since banks compete in strategic complements, the merged banks drive the loan rate
movements in the market and the competitors move in the same direction. The eﬀect of a
merger on loan rates depends on the relative strength of a market power eﬀect and a cost
eﬃciency eﬀect.T h e ﬁrst refers to the higher market power banks enjoy after a merger
because of the lower number of active banks (which reduces from N to N −1). The second
derives from the lower total marginal costs cm that the merged banks enjoy relative to
competitors. Post-merger equilibrium loan rates increase when the merger induces small
cost advantages relative to the increase in market power, whereas they decrease otherwise.
Loan market shares across banks change in line with loan rates. As the merged banks
change their loan rates by more than competitors, their total loan market share shrinks
when loan rates increase and it expands otherwise, i.e., Lm < 2Lsq < 2Lc when rL
m >r L
c ,
and Lm > 2Lsq > 2Lc otherwise.
The modiﬁcation of loan market shares together with the change in the optimal reserve-
deposit ratio described in Proposition 2 determines the eﬀects on the size of banks’ balance
sheets (as measured by the amount of deposits). In the present set-up the merger breaks
9The expressions for cm, cc a r ei nt h ep r o o fo ft h i sp r o p o s i t i o n ;t h o s ef o rkm and kc are, respectively, in
the proof of Proposition 2 and in equation (10).
18the symmetry in banks’ balance sheets. Whereas in the status quo all banks have the same
deposits Dsq, the merged banks have now in general diﬀerent deposit sizes than competitors,
i.e., Dm
Dc 6= 2. This is what we assume here, although the opposite could also happen: starting
from a situation of an asymmetric banking system, the merger could reduce the asymmetry
among banks and make the system more homogenous.
4.3 Individual Banks’ Liquidity Risk and Expected Needs
The eﬀects of the merger on both banks’ reserve holdings and loan competition aﬀect also
banks’ liquidity risks and expected liquidity needs. The results for competitor banks are
quite straightforward. As they follow the same optimal reserve rule as in the status quo,
they face the same liquidity risk φc = φsq =
q
rD
rI (see Corollary 1). Their expected
liquidity needs, however, change with their balance sheet, as ωc = rD
2rIDc.T h e m e r g e d
banks experience more far reaching changes in probability of facing a liquidity shortage and
in the size of the expected needs.
Corollary 3 The merged banks have lower liquidity risk than a single bank in the status
quo.
This result derives directly from the readjustment of the merged banks’ reserve holdings.
As stated in Proposition 2, when the relative cost of reﬁnancing is below the threshold ρ,
the merged banks increase their reserve-deposit ratio and their liquidity risk goes down. In
the other case, although they choose a lower reserve-deposit ratio than in the status quo,
they still keep it suﬃciently high to decrease the liquidity risk. This eﬀect is so strong that
the liquidity risk of the merged banks is not only lower than the risks of two banks in the
status quo, but it is even lower than that of a single bank.
Corollary 4 The merged banks have lower expected liquidity needs than in the status quo
if Dm
Dsq <h ,w h e r e2 <h≤ 4, and higher ones otherwise.
The merger changes the merged banks’ expected needs for three reasons. First, it creates
the internal money market, which reduces ceteris paribus expected liquidity needs. Second,
the merger modiﬁes the merged banks’ optimal reserve-deposit ratio, which reduces ceteris
paribus expected liquidity needs when the relative cost of reﬁnancing is low. Third, the
19merger changes the merged banks’ deposits, and hence the size of their demand for liquidity.
Corollary 4 shows that the ﬁrst eﬀect dominates unless cost advantages (eﬃciency gains and
reduced ﬁnancing costs) and competition in the loan market (degree of loan diﬀerentiation
γ and number of banks N) are so strong that the merged banks increase their balance sheets
substantially relative to two banks in the status quo. From an empirical perspective, such
a strong balance-sheet expansion seems to be a less plausible scenario.
5T h e E ﬀects of a Merger on Aggregate Liquidity
N o wt h a tw eh a v es e e nh o wam e r g e ra ﬀects the behavior of individual banks, we can turn
to its implications for the banking system as a whole. To see this, we analyze how changes
in banks’ reserve holdings and in loan market competition modify the aggregate supply and
demand of liquidity, as represented respectively by the sum of all banks’ reserves and of
their demands for liquidity at date 1 when shocks materialize.
We identify two channels. The ﬁrst one we call reserve channel,a si tw o r k st h r o u g h
changes in reserve holdings. When looking at the system as a whole, the distinction be-
tween the internal money market of the merged banks and the interbank market is blurred,
and the total supply of liquidity is composed of the sum of all banks’ reserve holdings.
Nevertheless, the existence of the internal money market aﬀects the total supply of liquidity
through the change in the reserve holdings of the merged banks. The second channel is
an asymmetry channel,w h i c ha ﬀects the distribution of the aggregate liquidity demand.
This channel originates in the asymmetry of balance sheets across banks, which −as shown
above− depends on both the diﬀerent amounts of reserves and the diﬀerent loan market
shares that banks have after the merger.
We start with analyzing each of the two channels in isolation. Then we examine how
they interact in determining aggregate liquidity risk and expected aggregate liquidity needs.
5.1 Asymmetry Channel without Internal Money Market
To isolate the working of the asymmetry channel, we assume for a moment that the merged
banks cannot make use of the internal money market. In this case, they do not have any
ﬁnancing cost advantages, and they choose the same optimal reserve rule as their competi-
tors. As a consequence, the asymmetry in banks’ balance sheets originates only from the
20diﬀerent distribution of market shares resulting from loan competition.
As all banks continue to choose reserves according to (10) and as the aggregate demand
for loans is inelastic, the merger does not aﬀect the total amounts of reserves and deposits,
thus leaving the aggregate supply of private liquidity unchanged. The asymmetry of banks’
balance sheets, however, modiﬁes the aggregate liquidity demand, which changes from Xsq =
PN
i=1 δiDsq in the status quo to Xm = δ1
Dm
2 + δ2
Dm
2 +
PN
i=3 δiDc after the merger. Both
Xsq and Xm are weighted sums of N uniform random variables, but in the ﬁrst case weights
are equal and in the second case they diﬀer (according to deposit sizes Dm
2 and Dc). This
brings us to the main result about the asymmetry channel.
Proposition 4 Suppose the merged banks do not exchange reserves internally. Then, the
aggregate liquidity eﬀects of the merger are as follows:
1. The merger decreases aggregate liquidity risk if the relative cost of reﬁnancing is below
a threshold σ ( rI
rD < σ < ρ), and increases it otherwise;
2. The merger always increases expected aggregate liquidity needs.
The intuition behind Proposition 4 is similar to that one behind Lemma 1. Moving
from a uniformly weighted sum of random variables (in the status quo) to a heterogeneously
weighted sum of random variables (after merger) increases the variance of the total sum.
Thus, as Figure 3 illustrates, the distribution of Xsq gives lower probability to extreme
events —very low and very high realizations of the aggregate liquidity demand— than that of
Xm.
This change in the distribution of Xm reduces the aggregate liquidity risk if the relative
cost of reﬁnancing is low (below the threshold σ), because it increases the probability that
the aggregate liquidity demand is below the total private supply. This is illustrated in Figure
3, where total reserves —indicated by the vertical line
PN
i=1 Ri—a r el o wa n dt h ea r e a1−Φm
is larger than the diagonally striped area 1 − Φsq. The opposite happens when the relative
cost of reﬁnancing is high.
[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE]
Proposition 4 also states that the merger always increases the expected amount of public
liquidity needed. The reason is that the expected aggregate liquidity needs depend not only
21on the frequency with which aggregate liquidity demand exceeds aggregate supply, but also
on the magnitude of each excess. As noted earlier, the merger increases the variance of the
distribution of Xm and thus the probability of events with very low and very high demands.
If banks do not hold reserves, these increases oﬀset each other and the expected aggregate
liquidity needs are the same before and after the merger. By contrast, when banks hold
positive reserves, they can cover the events with low aggregate liquidity demand. Hence, the
higher probability of extreme events with high aggregate liquidity demand is not outweighed
any more by the higher frequency of low demand events, and the expected aggregate liquidity
needs grow.
Note that the results of Proposition 4 crucially depend on the fact that we are focusing on
mergers that lead to more asymmetry in banks’ balance sheets, like those among large banks.
Of course, mergers may also have the opposite eﬀect of making banks more symmetric.
This could happen, for example, when mergers involve smaller banks. In such a case, the
functioning of the asymmetry channel is reversed and mergers reduce expected aggregate
liquidity needs. We need to keep this in mind when discussing our results further below.
5.2 Interaction with the Reserve Channel
In this section we reintroduce the possibility for the merged banks to use the internal money
market. We ﬁrst analyze how this aﬀects aggregate liquidity through the reserve channel.
Denote as
Km =
Rm +
PN
i=3 Rc
Dm +( N − 2)Dc
=
kmDm +
PN
i=3 kcDc
Dm +( N − 2)Dc
(12)
the aggregate reserve-deposit ratio after the merger. Since competitors choose the same ratio
as in the status quo (kc = ksq), the change in Km is solely determined by the change in the
merged banks’ reserve-deposit ratio. Hence, it follows from Proposition 2 that Km increases
when the relative cost of reﬁnancing is relatively low (because then km >k sq), whereas
it decreases otherwise. The following lemma describes how the change in the aggregate
reserve-deposit ratio alone aﬀects aggregate liquidity.
Lemma 2 Suppose the merger does not cause any asymmetry in banks’ balance sheets
(Dm =2 Dc). Then, it decreases aggregate liquidity risk and expected aggregate liquidity
needs if the relative cost of reﬁnancing is below ρ ( rI
rD < ρ), and it increases them otherwise.
22When the merger does not generate asymmetry across banks’ balance sheets, it aﬀects
aggregate liquidity only through the reserve channel. The aggregate supply of private liq-
uidity changes, whereas the aggregate liquidity demand remains the same. Thus, the merger
reduces both aggregate liquidity risk and expected aggregate liquidity needs when the ag-
gregate supply of private liquidity increases through the higher reserve-deposit ratio of the
merged banks. The opposite happens when the aggregate liquidity supply falls.
When the merger generates the internal money market and modiﬁes bank sizes, both the
asymmetry and the reserve channel are at work. Depending on the size of the relative cost
of reﬁnancing, the two channels can reinforce or oﬀset each other. Therefore, we consider
the cases of high and low relative cost of reﬁnancing separately.
Proposition 5 I ft h er e l a t i v ec o s to fr e ﬁnancing is above ρ ( rI
rD > ρ), the merger increases
both aggregate liquidity risk and expected aggregate liquidity needs.
When the relative cost of reﬁnancing is rather high, the asymmetry channel and the
reserve channel work in the same direction. The asymmetry channel increases the variance
of the aggregate liquidity demand, and the reserve channel reduces the aggregate liquidity
supply through the lower reserve holdings of the merged banks. Both these eﬀects make the
system more vulnerable to liquidity shortages and thus more dependent on public liquidity
provision.
Proposition 6 I ft h er e l a t i v ec o s to fr e ﬁnancing is below ρ ( rI
rD < ρ), then the following
holds:
1. There exists a critical level of the relative cost of reﬁnancing g ∈ (σ,ρ) such that the
merger reduces aggregate liquidity risk if the cost of reﬁnancing is below such critical
level, and increases it otherwise;
2. For any small level of asymmetry induced by the merger, there exists a set G of values of
the relative cost of reﬁnancing, with G ⊂ (1,ρ), for which the merger reduces expected
aggregate liquidity needs.
When the cost of reﬁnancing is relatively low, the reserve and the asymmetry channels
drive aggregate liquidity in opposite directions, and the net eﬀect depends on their relative
23strength. As shown in Lemma 2, the reserve channel reduces both aggregate liquidity risk
and expected liquidity needs. This occurs because the banking system has more reserves in
aggregate through the higher reserve holdings of the merged banks. As stated in Proposition
4, however, the asymmetry channel always increases expected aggregate liquidity needs,
whereas it reduces aggregate liquidity risk only if the relative cost of reﬁnancing is suﬃciently
low.
Thus, when the two channels interact, the merger reduces aggregate liquidity risk for a
larger range of parameter values than in Proposition 4, where only the asymmetry channel
is active. Similarly, it increases aggregate liquidity risk in a larger range of parameter values
than in Lemma 2, where only the reserve channel is present.
As for the expected aggregate liquidity needs, the reserve channel dominates when the
asymmetry induced by the merger is suﬃciently small. Thus, there is a range of values of the
relative cost of reﬁnancing for which the merger reduces expected aggregate liquidity needs.
The larger the asymmetry in banks’ balance sheets, the larger is this range of parameters
in which the merger increases expected aggregate liquidity needs. Taken together, the
results in Proposition 6 suggest that central banks have to be more attentive to the liquidity
ﬂuctuations of the interbank market and intervene more often after a consolidation process
that leads to higher aggregate liquidity risk and higher expected liquidity needs.
How relevant are these diﬀerent scenarios for changes in aggregate liquidity? One way to
proceed is to associate the level of the relative cost of reﬁnancing with diﬀerent countries or
ﬁnancial systems. For example, in industrial countries with relatively sizable and developed
ﬁnancial systems one would expect this cost to be rather low. In contrast, in developing or
emerging countries with less developed ﬁnancial systems this cost may be quite high. Then,
Proposition 5 suggests that in the latter group of countries bank consolidation may lead
to a deterioration of aggregate liquidity. Proposition 6 indicates instead that the impact
of mergers on aggregate liquidity in industrial countries crucially depends on whether the
reserve or the asymmetry channel dominates. The asymmetry channel may dominate when
consolidation takes the form of mergers between large banks leading to a ‘polarization’ of
the banking system. Table 1 suggests that something like this seems to have happened in a
number of industrial countries during the 1990s. For example, in Belgium, Canada, France,
the Netherlands, and Sweden, consolidation enlarged substantially the share of the largest
24players, thus increasing the asymmetry among banks. Diﬀerently, in countries like Australia
and Germany, the weight of the largest banks hardly changed. So it may be possible that
the reserve channel may have dominated in those countries, thus leading to an improvement
in aggregate liquidity. A similar result may have occurred in Japan and the UK, where
−according to Table 1− consolidation has even led to a more symmetric banking system
and thus to a reversed functioning of the asymmetry channel.
Note that we primarily address the structural eﬀects of bank mergers on loan compe-
tition, reserve holdings and aggregate liquidity, but in practice business cycles may aﬀect
some of our variables. In particular, the relative cost of reﬁnancing is aﬀected by trading
conditions in the interbank market and the level of interest rates, and it may behave pro-
cyclically. This implies that bank mergers involving large banks may aﬀect reserve holdings
and private liquidity more negatively in upturns than in downturns. Our results above have
therefore to be interpreted as the “average” (or structural) eﬀects of mergers over time. It
would be interesting to extend our model in future research to explicitly cover macroeco-
nomic features and analyze in depth how reserve holdings and aggregate liquidity change
over the business cycle.
6 The Relationship between Competition and Aggregate Liq-
uidity
We now discuss more in detail how loan market competition and reserve choices interact
in determining loan rates and aggregate liquidity (for simplicity, here interpreted only as
expected aggregate liquidity needs), and how liquidity eﬀects relate to competition eﬀects.
At the individual bank level, the loan market equilibrium aﬀects banks’ reserve holdings
(in absolute terms) by determining the amount of deposits required to ﬁnance loans, and
hence the size of liquidity demands at any given level of reserves. Equilibrium reserve
holdings determine banks’ ﬁnancing costs —the sum of the expected cost of reﬁnancing and
of the expected repayment to depositors—, and thereby inﬂuence the loan market equilibrium.
At the aggregate level, loan market competition aﬀects the degree of asymmetry in banks’
balance sheets through the distribution of equilibrium loan market shares.
T a b l e2s u m m a r i z e st h ep o s s i b l ee ﬀects of mergers on both loan rates rL and expected
aggregate liquidity needs Ω, as described in Propositions 3, 5 and 6. The rows of the table
25indicate whether a merger is characterized by low or high eﬃciency gains in terms of both
reduced loan provision costs and lower ﬁnancing costs (cm
cc high or low); the two columns
show the cases of high and low relative cost of reﬁnancing rI
rD.
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]
As Table 2 shows, the model predicts several scenarios, depending on the value of the
parameters. The eﬀect of mergers on expected aggregate liquidity needs is ambiguous when
t h er e l a t i v ec o s to fr e ﬁnancing is low, whereas it is always negative when the relative cost
of reﬁnancing is high. Concerning competition, mergers increase loan rates when the cost
eﬃciency eﬀect, as measured by the ratio cm
cc , is small relative to the increased market power,
and, vice versa, decrease loan rates when cost eﬃciencies dominate.
What can we say about the plausibility of the diﬀerent scenarios displayed in Table 2? As
already indicated above, one may associate for example low reﬁnancing costs with industrial
countries and high reﬁnancing costs with developing or emerging countries. Moreover, one
may relate the magnitude of eﬃciency gains to the size of mergers. Even if there is an ongoing
debate in the literature on whether eﬃciency gains (and, in particular, scale economies)
exhaust at large or small sizes of output, the empirical consensus seems still to be that
mergers between small banks produce larger eﬃciency gains than mergers between large
banks.10
One plausible scenario in industrial countries (low rI
rD) is therefore the occurrence of
mergers between large banks leading to higher loan rates and expected aggregate liquidity
needs, as they do not realize suﬃcient eﬃciency gains and induce greater asymmetry in the
banking system (one case in cell I). Diﬀerently, the occurrence of mergers between small
banks in industrial countries is likely to reduce both loan rates and expected aggregate
liquidity needs, as smaller mergers may realize more eﬃciency gains relative to the increase
in market power and make the banking system more homogenous (one case in cell II). For
developing countries (high rI
rD), cells III and IV suggest that mergers would always increase
10A substantial amount of empirical research has been spent on measuring the eﬃciency gains generated
by bank mergers, but results are not unanimous (see, e.g., the surveys of Carletti et al., 2002; and Rhoades,
1994 and 1998). Whereas the mainstream literature suggests that banks exhaust potential scale economies
at modest levels of size (see, e.g., Berger et al., 1987; Berger and Humphrey, 1991; and Wheelock and
Wilson, 2001), other studies (e.g., Berger and Mester, 1997; and Hughes et al., 2001) ﬁnd that there are scale
economies also at large balance sheet sizes if one takes changes in risk into account.
26expected aggregate needs, whereas the eﬀect on loan rates may still depend on their sizes.
The interesting features of these results are that mergers are likely, ceteris paribus, to
increase expected aggregate liquidity needs more in developing countries than in industrial
ones, as they lead to lower reserve holdings for higher cost of reﬁnancing; and that there
is more complementarity between competition and liquidity in industrial countries than in
developing ones. In terms of policy implications, these results suggest that policies aiming
at promoting loan market competition may also prevent the adverse eﬀects of consolidation
for interbank liquidity in industrial countries, but not necessarily in developing countries.
7C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper analyzes the impact of bank mergers on credit market competition, reserves
and banking system liquidity. A merger creates an internal money market, which modiﬁes
merged banks’ optimal choice of reserves holdings, either decreasing them through a diver-
siﬁcation eﬀect or −more surprisingly− increasing them through an internalization eﬀect.
In both situations, merged banks beneﬁt from a better estimate of future shocks and scope
economies in their liquidity management, and they lower their ﬁnancing costs and liquidity
risk.
The change in merged banks’ reserve holdings, together with the change in the size of
banks’ balance sheets due to altered loan competition, aﬀect the functioning of the interbank
market. Changes in reserve holdings modify the aggregate supply of private liquidity, while
increased balance-sheet asymmetry raises aggregate liquidity needs by altering the distribu-
tion of the aggregate liquidity demand. These reserve and asymmetry channels can work in
the same or in opposite directions, depending on the cost of reﬁnancing in the money market
as compared to the cost of ﬁnancing through retail deposits. We conclude that mergers are
more likely to increase aggregate liquidity needs when they involve large banks leading to a
‘polarization’ of the banking system. Moreover, the risk of adverse liquidity eﬀects of bank
consolidation is likely to be more relevant when the ratio of interbank to deposit funding
costs is high. In this case there is also a lower complementarity between competition and
liquidity, so that the eﬀects of consolidation on loan rates and aggregate liquidity do not
necessarily go hand in hand. These results have important implications for central banks’
money market operations.
27The model implies some empirical hypotheses, which would be interesting to test in fu-
ture research. While the competition eﬀects of bank mergers are already quite well covered
in the empirical literature, the same does not apply to the liquidity eﬀects. At the individual
level it would be interesting to estimate the eﬀects of mergers on reserve holdings, and in
particular the role of reﬁnancing costs for the sign of reserve changes. At the aggregate level,
it would be important to examine how asymmetry in bank sizes relates to liquidity ﬂuctua-
tions. Moreover, it could be tested whether countries with relatively high reﬁnancing costs
experiencing banking consolidation display a deterioration in aggregate liquidity, whereas
others don’t. Finally, it could be interesting to examine econometrically whether countries
with greater bank competition face larger or smaller aggregate liquidity ﬂuctuations.
Some features of the model deserve further discussion. The interbank market works
in a very simple way. In the ultra-short interbank market, the central bank adjusts the
liquidity supply to accommodate changes in the aggregate demand, and banks can always
meet the repayment to depositors without suﬀering any liquidity crisis. In a similar spirit,
long-term loans are totally illiquid, or, equivalently, the costs of liquidation are higher than
t h er e l a t i v ec o s to fr e ﬁnancing. This framework allows us to focus on pure liquidity issues,
and isolate reserve management from other considerations. An interesting extension of this
model would be to analyze the functioning of other, longer term interbank markets, where
the central bank would not be active and banks could modify the liquidity supply only by
selling their long-term assets. We leave this for future research.
28Appendix
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1
Using Leibniz’s rule and (1), from (9) we obtain the ﬁrst order conditions with respect to
the choice variables rL
i and Ri:
∂Πi
∂rL
i
= Li +( rL
i − c)
∂Li
∂rL
i
−
·
rI
2
L2
i +2 LiRi
(Li + Ri)2 +
rD
2
¸
∂Li
∂rL
i
=0 , for i =1 ...N, (13)
∂Πi
∂Ri
= rD(Li + Ri)2 − rIL2
i =0 , for i =1 ...N. (14)
Solving (14) for Ri gives
Ri =
Ãr
rI
rD − 1
!
Li. (15)
Solving (13) for rL
i in a symmetric equilibrium where rL
i = rL
sq for i =1 ...N after substituting
(2) and (15) gives
l +( rL
sq − c −
√
rIrD)(−γ
N − 1
N
)=0 ,
from which rL
sq and csq follow. Substituting then rL
sq in (2) gives Lsq, and through (15) Rsq.
Substituting Rsq and Lsq in (1), we obtain Dsq. Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fC o r o l l a r y1
Solving (3) and (4) gives φi =1− Ri
Di and ωi =
(Ri)2
2Di −Ri+ Di
2 . Substituting the expressions
for Rsq and Dsq,w eo b t a i nφsq and ωsq as in the corollary. Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fL e m m a1
We proceed in two steps. First, we show that the variance of the liquidity demand xm of
the merged banks is minimized when deposits are raised symmetrically in the two regions.
Second, we show that the expected liquidity needs of the merged banks (and therefore their
reﬁnancing costs) are lower when deposits are symmetric.
Step 1. Deﬁne the liquidity demand of the merged banks as
xm = δ1αDm + δ2(1 − α)Dm,
where α ∈ [0,1] indicates the fraction of deposits that the merged banks raise in one region
and (1−α) the fraction they raise in the other region. Since δ1 and δ2 are independent and
Va r(δ1)=Va r(δ2), the variance of xm is simply
Va r(xm)=α2D2
mVa r(δ1)+( 1− α)2D2
mVa r(δ2)
= Va r(δ1)[α2D2
m +( 1− α)2D2
m].
29Diﬀerentiating it with respect to α,w eo b t a i n
∂Va r(xm)
∂α
=2 D2Va r(δ1)(2α − 1) = 0,
which has a minimum at α = 1
2.
Step 2. Deﬁne now the liquidity demand of the merged banks as
xma = δ1αDm + δ2(1 − α)Dm,
when α 6= 1
2,a n da s
xms = δ1
Dm
2
+ δ2
Dm
2
when α = 1
2. Applying the general formula in Bradley and Gupta (2002) to our case,
the density functions of xma and xms can be written as (assume α < 1
2 without loss of
generality):
fma(xma)=

  
  
xma
α(1−α)D2
m for xma ≤ αDm
1
(1−α)Dm for αDm <x ma ≤ (1 − α)Dm
Dm−xma
α(1−α)D2
m for xma > (1 − α)Dm,
fms(xms)=

  
  
4xm
D2
m for xms ≤ Dm/2
4(Dm−xms)
D2
m for xms >D m/2.
(16)
Since α < 1
2, fma(xma) is steeper than fms(xms) both for xma ≤ αDm and for xma >
(1 − α)Dm. This implies that the two density functions do not cross in these intervals,
whereas they do it in two points in the interval αDm <x ma ≤ (1−α)Dm. Given that they
are symmetric around the same mean Dm/2w i t hVa r(xma) >Va r(xms), it is:
Fma >F ms for Rm <
Dm
2
, (17)
Fma <F ms for Rm >
Dm
2
,
where Fma =P r ( xma <R m)a n dFms =P r ( xms <R m).
Denote now as ωma and ωms the expected liquidity needs of the merged banks with asym-
metric deposits and symmetric deposits respectively. We have
ωma − ωms =
Z Dm
Rm
(xma − Rm)fma(xma)d(xma) −
Z Dm
Rm
(xms − Rm)fms(xms)d(xms)
=
Z Dm
Rm
xmafma(xma)d(xma) −
Z Dm
Rm
xmsfms(xms)d(xms) (18)
−Rm(1 − Fma(Rm)) + Rm(1 − Fms(Rm)).
30Diﬀerentiating (18) with respect to Rm gives
d(ωma − ωms)
dRm
= −Rmfma(Rm)+Rmfms(Rm) − (1 − Fma(Rm))
+Rmfma(Rm)+( 1− Fms(Rm)) − Rmfms(Rm)
= Fma(Rm) − Fms(Rm).
From (17) it follows
d(ωma−ωms)
dRm > 0f o rRm < Dm
2 and
d(ωma−ωms)
dRm < 0 otherwise. This,
along with ωma − ωms =0b o t hf o rRm = 0 and for Rm = Dm implies ωma − ωms > 0f o r
all Rm ∈ [0,D m]. Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2
The demand for liquidity of the merged banks, xm = δ1
Dm
2 + δ2
Dm
2 , has density function
as in (16). Using Leibniz’s rule, the equality Dm = Rm + L1 + L2, and the ratio km = Rm
Dm,
from (11) we can express the ﬁrst order condition ∂Πm
∂Rm =0a s

 
 
8
3k3
m − 4k2
m +1= rD
rI for km ≤ 1/2
8
3(1 − km)3 = rD
rI for km > 1/2.
(19)
The term on the LHS of the equalities is the marginal beneﬁt of increasing the reserve-
deposit ratio, that is the reduction in the expected need of reﬁnancing induced by a marginal
increase of the reserve ratio. The term on the RHS of the equalities is the ratio between the
marginal cost of raising reserves rD and the marginal cost of reﬁnancing rI. From (19), we
obtain:
km =

  
  
z(rI,rD)f o r rI ≤ 3rD
1 −
3
q
3
8
rD
rI for rI > 3rD,
(20)
where z(rI,rD) is the solution of the equation z3− 3
2z2+ 3
8(1− rD
rI ) = 0 in the interval (0, 1
2]
increasing in the ratio rI
rD.S i n c ef(0) > 0, f(1/2) < 0a n df0(z) < 0, z(rI,rD) is the unique
real solution.
To compare km with ksq,w er e a r r a n g eksq given in (10) as
(1 − ksq)2 =
rD
rI , (21)
where, as before, the LHS is the marginal beneﬁt of increasing the reserve-deposit ratio and
the RHS is the ratio between the marginal cost of raising deposits and holding reserves rD
and the marginal cost of reﬁnancing rI.
31Denote as f(km) the LHS of (19) and as f(ksq) the LHS of (21). Plotting f(km)a n d
f(ksq)f o rksq and km between 0 and 1, we get Figure 4.
[FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE]
The curves f(km)a n df(ksq) cross only once at ksq = km = 5
8. Substituting this value in
(19) or (21) gives ksq = km when rI
rD = 64
9 ≡ ρ.T h u s ,km >k sq if rI
rD < ρ,a n dkm <k sq
otherwise. Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fC o r o l l a r y2
From the last two terms in (8), we can express the ﬁnancing costs of competitors as
rI
2
L2
c
(Rc + Lc)
+
rD
2
(Rc + Lc). (22)
Using Rc
Dc = kc and Lc
Dc =1− kc in (22) and rearranging terms, we obtain
rI(1 − kc)2 + rD
2(1 − kc)
. (23)
Analogously, from the last two terms in (11), using Rm
Dm = km and Lm
Dm =1− km,w eo b t a i n
the ﬁnancing costs of the merged banks as

  
  
rI(3−6km+4k3
m)+3rD
6(1−km) for rI ≤ 3rD
4rI(1−km)3+3rD
6(1−km) for rI > 3rD.
(24)
It is easy to check that when the merged banks set km at the level which is optimal for
competitors, the ﬁnancing costs of the merged banks are always lower than the ones of the
competitors. A fortiori this must be true when they set km to minimize their ﬁnancial costs.
Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3
The merged banks choose rL
1 and rL
2 to maximize (11) while competitors choose rL
i to
maximize (8) where the subscript i is now c.D e ﬁne from the ﬁnancing costs in Corollary 2
((23) and (24)) the total marginal costs of the competitors and the merged banks as
cc = c +
rI(1 − kc)2 + rD
2(1 − kc)
(25)
and
32cm =

  
  
βc +
rI(3−6km+4k3
m)+3rD
6(1−km) for rI ≤ 3rD
βc +
4rI(1−km)3+3rD
6(1−km) for rI > 3rD,
(26)
respectively. Using the expressions for km and kc in (20) and (21), those for cc and cm in
(25) and (26), Dm = Rm + L1 + L2 and Dc = Rc + Lc, we can write the expected proﬁts
for the merged banks and competitors when reserves are chosen optimally as
Πm = rL
1 L1 + rL
2 L2 − cm(L1 + L2)
Πc =( rL
1 − cc)Lc,
where
Lm = L1 + L2 =

l − γ

rL
1 −
1
N
N X
j=1
rL
j



 +

L − γ

rL
2 −
1
N
N X
j=1
rL
j



, (27)
and Lc is given by (2). The ﬁrst order conditions are then given by
∂Πm
∂rL
h
= Lh +( rL
1 − cm)
∂L1
∂rL
h
+( rL
2 − cm)
∂L2
∂rL
h
=0f o rh =1 ,2 (28)
∂Πc
∂rL
i
= Lc +( rL
i − cc)
∂Lc
∂rL
i
=0f o ri =3 ...N. (29)
We look at the post-merger equilibrium where rL
1 = rL
2 = rL
m and rL
i = rL
c . Substituting
(27) in (28) and (2) in (29), we obtain the best response functions as
rL
m =
l
2γ(N−2
N )
+
cm
2
+
rL
c
2
. (30)
rL
c =
l
γ(N+1
N )
+(
N − 1
N +1
)cc +
2
N +1
rL
m. (31)
Solving (30) and (31) gives the post-merger equilibrium loan rates rL
m and rL
c . Substituting
rL
m and rL
c respectively in (27) and in (2) gives the equilibrium Lm and Lc. Analogously, we
derive Dm and Dc. Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fC o r o l l a r y3
33Using (16), we can express the liquidity risk for the merged banks as
φm =P r ( xm >R m)=

  
  
1 −
R Rm
0
4xm
D2
m dxm for rI ≤ 3rD
R Dm
Rm
4(Dm−xm)
D2
m dxm for rI > 3rD.
Solving the integrals, we obtain φm =1 −2
R2
m
D2
m for rI ≤ 3rD and 2−4Rm
Dm +2
R2
m
D2
m for rI > 3rD.
Substituting km = Rm
Dm implies
φm =

 
 
1 − 2k2
m for rI ≤ 3rD
2(1 − km)2 for rI > 3rD.
Substituting km as in (20), we can express the merged banks’ resiliency as
1 − φm =

  
  
2[z(rI,rD)]2 for rI ≤ 3rD
1 − 2(
3
q
3
8
rD
rI )2 for rI > 3rD.
Similarly, from Corollary 1 we can write a bank’s individual resiliency in the status quo as
1 − φsq = ksq =1−
q
rD
rI . Plotting these expressions as a function of the ratio rI
rD,o n e
immediately sees that 1−φm > 1−φsq always holds, so that φm < φsq. The plot is available
from the authors upon request. Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fC o r o l l a r y4
Using (16), we can express the expected liquidity needs for the merged banks as
ωm =

   
   
R Dm
2
Rm (xm − Rm)4xm
D2
m dxm +
R Dm
Dm
2
(xm − Rm)
4(Dm−xm)
D2
m dxm for rI ≤ 3rD
R Dm
Dm
2
(xm − Rm)
4(Dm−xm)
D2
m dxm for rI > 3rD.
Solving the integrals, we obtain ωm = Dm
2 − Rm + 2
3
R3
m
D2
m for rI ≤ 3rD and 2
3
(Dm−Rm)3
D2
m
for rI > 3rD. Substituting km = Rm
Dm,w eo b t a i n
ωm =

 
 
¡1
2 − km + 2
3k3
m
¢
Dm for rI ≤ 3rD
2
3(1 − km)3Dm for rI > 3rD.
To compare ωm with 2ωsq, we substitute (20) in the above expression for ωm and (21) in
the expression for ωsq as in Corollary 1. We obtain:
ωm − 2ωsq =

 
 
¡1
2 − km + 2
3k3
m
¢
Dm − (1 − ksq)
2 Dsq for rI ≤ 3rD
rD
rI
¡Dm
4 − Dsq
¢
for rI > 3rD.
34For rI > 3rD it is immediate to see that ωm−2ωsq < 0i fDm
Dsq < 4. For rI ≤ 3rD, ωm−2ωsq
can be rearranged as
ωm − 2ωsq =( 1− ksq)
2 Dsq
"¡1
2 − km + 2
3k3
m
¢
(1 − ksq)
2
Dm
Dsq
− 1
#
.
Suppose for a moment km = ksq and Dm =2 Dsq. Then, the expression simpliﬁes to
k2
sqDsq
¡4
3ksq − 1
¢
, which is negative because ksq < 1/2. To see that this holds also for
km >k sq, we use (21) and rewrite ωm − 2ωsq as
ωm − 2ωsq =
rD
rI Dsq
·
rI
rD
µ
1
2
− km +
2
3
k3
m
¶
Dm
Dsq
− 1
¸
.
Denote now A =
¡1
2 − km + 2
3k3
m
¢
.S i n c eA is decreasing in km and km >k sq for rI ≤ 3rD,
it follows ωm − 2ωsq < 0w h e nDm =2 Dsq. The same holds for Dm
Dsq < 2. By plotting the
expression ( rI
rDADm
Dsq −1) for Dm
Dsq > 2a n d rI
rD ∈ (1,3], one sees that there is a level h ∈ (2,4)
of the ratio Dm
Dsq such that ωm ≤ 2ωsq if Dm
Dsq ≤ h,a n dωm > 2ωsq otherwise. The plot is
available from the authors upon request. Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4
This proof is a generalization of that of Lemma 1. Let Dtot denote the total deposits
NDsq = Dm +( N − 2)Dc,a n dl e tRtot denote the total reserves NRsq = Rm +( N − 2)Rc.
Applying the general formula for the distribution of a weighted sum of uniformly distributed
random variables in Bradley and Gupta (2002) to our model, we obtain the density functions
of the aggregate liquidity demands in the status quo fsq(Xsq) and after the merger fm(Xm)
as
fsq(Xsq)=
1
(N − 1)!(Dsq)N
N X
i=0
·
(−1)i
µ
N
i
¶
(Xsq − iDsq)
N−1
+
¸
,
fm(Xm)=
PN−2
i=1
h
(−1)
i ¡N−2
i−1
¢
(Xm − Dm − (i − 1)Dc)
N−2
+ +
¡N−2
i
¢
(Xm − iDc)
N−2
+
i
(N − 2)!Dm(Dc)N−2 .
The two density functions are plotted in Figure 3. The density fsq(Xsq) is more concentrated
around the mean than fm(Xm). To verify that this is always the case, we compare the
variances of Xsq and Xm,w h i c ha r eg i v e nb y
Va r(Xsq)=
N X
i=1
D2
sqVa r(δi),
35Va r(Xm)=
D2
m
4
Va r(δ1)+
D2
m
4
Va r(δm)+
N X
i=3
D2
cVa r(δi)
= Va r(δi)
"
D2
m
2
+
N X
i=3
D2
c
#
because Va r(δ1)=Va r(δ2)=Va r(δi). Since Dm +
PN
i=3 Dc =
PN
i=1 Dsq,o n eo b -
tains
hP2
i=1
D2
m
4 +
PN
i=3 D2
c
i
>
PN
i=1 D2
sq by Lagrangian maximization. Hence, it is al-
ways Va r(Xm) >Va r (Xsq). Since f(Xsq)a n df(Xm) are well behaved (they approach
a normal distribution), they intersect only in two points.11 This, along with the sym-
metry of the two density functions around the same mean E[Xm]=E[Xsq]=Dtot
2 and
Va r(Xm) >Va r(Xsq), implies
Φsq =P r ( Xsq >R tot) > Φm =P r ( Xm >R tot) for any Rtot <
Dtot
2
,
and vice versa for Rtot > Dtot
2 . Using Proposition 1, Rtot = NRsq, and (1), we obtain that
Rtot < Dtot
2 if rI
rD < 4 ≡ σ.T h eﬁrst statement follows.
Using the deﬁnition in (7), we have
Ωm − Ωsq =
Z Dtot
Rtot
(Xm − Rtot)fm(Xm)d(Xm) −
Z Dtot
Rtot
(Xsq − Rtot)fsq(Xsq)d(Xsq)
=
Z Dtot
Rtot
Xmfm(Xm)d(Xm) −
Z Dtot
Rtot
Xsqfsq(Xsq)d(Xsq)
−Rtot(1 − Fm(Rtot)) + Rtot(1 − Fsq(Rtot)).
Deriving it with respect to Rtot gives
d(Ωm − Ωsq)
dRtot
= −Rtotfm(Rtot)+Rtotfsq(Rtot) − (1 − Fm(Rtot))
+Rtotfm(Rtot)+( 1− Fsq(Rtot)) − Rtotfsq(Rtot)
= Fm(Rtot) − Fsq(Rtot).
As showed earlier, Fm(Rtot) − Fsq(Rtot) > 0f o rRtot < Dtot
2 and Fm(Rtot) − Fsq(Rtot) < 0
for Rtot > Dtot
2 .A l s o , Fm(0) = Fsq(0) = 0 and Fm(Rtot)=Fsq(Rtot) = 0. This implies
Ωm − Ωsq > 0 for all Rtot ∈ [0,D tot]. The second statement follows. Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fL e m m a3
Suppose ﬁrst rI
rD < ρ. In this range, the aggregate reserve/deposit ratio in the status quo
(which coincides with the individual banks’ deposit ratio) is smaller than the one after
merger; i.e.,
ksq =
Rsq
Dsq
=
PN
i=1 Rsq
NDsq
<K m
11A formal proof that this is the case is in Manzanares (2002).
36because km >k c = ksq. Consider now the aggregate liquidity risk. When Dm =2 Dc,t h i s
is given by
Φsq = prob
Ã
N X
i=1
δiDsq >
N X
i=1
Rsq
!
= prob(X0 <k sq)
in the status quo, and by
Φm = prob
Ã
N X
i=1
δiDc >R m +
N X
i=3
Rc
!
= prob(X0 <K m),
after the merger, where X0 =
PN
i=1
δi
N.S i n c eKm >k sq,i tf o l l o w sΦm < Φsq.
We can then express the expected aggregate liquidity needs in the status quo as
Ωsq =
Z NDsq
ksqNDsq
(Xsq − ksqNDsq)f(Xsq)d(Xsq)=NDsq
Z 1
ksq
(X
0
− ksq)f(X0)d(X0).
Applying the same logic, the post-merger expected aggregate liquidity needs are
Ωm = NDc
Z 1
Km
(X
0
− Km)f(X0)d(X0)
= NDsq (1 + (Km − ksq))
Z 1
Km
(X
0
− Km)f(X0)d(X0),
w h e r ew eh a v eu s e dDm =2 Dc and Dm +( N − 2)Dc = NDc = NDsq +( Km − ksq)NDsq.
Given Km >k sq, we can write the expected aggregate liquidity needs as
Ωsq = NDsq
"Z 1
Km
(X
0
− ksq)f(X0)d(X0)+
Z Km
ksq
(X
0
− ksq)f(X0)d(X0)
#
= NDsq
" R 1
Km(X
0
− Km)f(X0)d(X0)+( Km − ksq)
R 1
Km f(X0)d(X0)+
R Km
ksq (X
0
− Km)f(X0)d(X0),
#
and, after rearranging and simplifying, we have
Ωm − Ωsq = NDsq
"
(Km − ksq)
R 1
Km(X
0
− Km − 1)f(X0)d(X0)
−
R Km
ksq (X
0
sq − Km)f(X0)d(X0)
#
< 0
because (X
0
− Km − 1) < 0. Analogous steps can be followed for the case rI
rD > ρ. Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5
Proposition 4 implies that if km = ksq,t h e nΦm > Φsq and Ωm > Ωsq for any rI
rD > ρ.A
fortiori this must be true in equilibrium where km <k sq (Φm and Ωm are decreasing in Km,
which falls with km). Q.E.D.
37P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6
Statement 1. From the proof of Proposition 4, Km = ksq implies Φm = Φsq when rI
rD = σ,
and Φm < Φsq when rI
rD < σ.S i n c eKm >k sq in the range rI
rD < ρ,i ti sΦm < Φsq when
rI
rD = σ. The strict inequality and continuity imply that there must exist a neighborhood
where rI
rD > σ and Φm < Φsq.F o rrI
rD > ρ, Φm > Φsq (from Proposition 5); hence, there
must exist a critical level g ∈ (σ,ρ)( w i t hσ < ρ from the proofs of Propositions 2 and 4)
such that as Φm < Φsq if rI
rD <g ,a n dΦm > Φsq otherwise. The ﬁrst statement follows.
Statement 2. From Proposition 2, km = ksq for rI
rD =1a n d rI
rD = ρ,a n dkm >k sq for
1 < rI
rD < ρ. This induces the same relation between Km and ksq,s ot h a tKm − ksq is
ﬁrst increasing and then decreasing in the interval rI
rD ∈ (1,ρ). By Proposition 4, when
Dm 6=2 Dc there is a neighborhood of rI
rD =1w h e r eΩm − Ωsq > 0. Also, when rI
rD = ρ
and Dm 6=2 Dc, Ωm > Ωsq.W h e nrI
rD =1 ,i ti sa l w a y sΩm = Ωsq = Dtot
2 .F r o m L e m m a
3, when Dm =2 Dc it is Ωm − Ωsq < 0 for all rI
rD ∈ (1,ρ)a n dΩm = Ωsq when rI
rD = ρ.
By continuity, if one ﬁxes a suﬃciently small level of asymmetry in the deposit bases across
banks (Dm − 2Dc suﬃciently small), then Ωm − Ωsq > 0i na ni m m e d i a t en e i g h b o r h o o do f
rI
rD = 1. Given that Km − ksq is increasing around rI
rD = 1, there will be a higher ratio rI
rD,
named g, such that if the merger generates that asymmetry when rI
rD = g,t h e nΩm−Ωsq =0
and Ωm−Ωsq < 0 in the immediate right neighborhood. Again by continuity, Ωm−Ωsq > 0
in an immediate neighborhood of rI
rD = ρ. Given that Km−ksq is decreasing around rI
rD = ρ,
there will be a smaller ratio rI
rD,n a m e dg, such that, when rI
rD = g, then Ωm − Ωsq =0a n d
Ωm − Ωsq < 0 in the immediate left neighborhood. The second statement follows. Q.E.D.
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Figure 1: Banking consolidation in industrial countries, 1990-99
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
C
a
n
a
d
a
I
t
a
l
y
J
a
p
a
n
U
n
i
t
e
d
 
K
i
n
g
d
o
m
U
n
i
t
e
d
 
S
t
a
t
e
s
S
p
a
i
n
S
w
i
t
z
e
r
l
a
n
d
S
w
e
d
e
n
B
e
l
g
i
u
m
N
e
t
h
e
r
l
a
n
d
s
F
r
a
n
c
e
G
e
r
m
a
n
y
Extent of consolidation in %
CountryFigure 3: Aggregate liquidity risk before merger,        , and after merger, 
Liquidity excess
) ( sq sq X f
) ( sq sq X f
) ( m m X f
∑
=
N
i
i x
1
) ( m m X f
2
1 ∑
=
N
i
i D ∑
=
N
i
i D
1 ∑
=
N
i
i R
1
Liquidity shortage
sq Φ
m Φ
sq Φ − 1
m Φ − 1
sq Φ m Φ
σ < D
I
r
r
σ > D
I
r
rFigure 4:  Marginal benefits of higher reserve-deposit ratios for the merged banks,        , and for banks in the status quo,          
.                             
) ( sq k f
, ms q kk
() m f k
) ( sq k f
() m f k
1
1
5
8
ms q kk = =
) ( sq k f
() m f kCFS Working Paper Series: 
 
No.  Author(s)  Title 
2006/08  Elena Carletti 
Philipp Hartmann 
Giancarlo Spagnolo 
Bank Mergers, Competition and Liquidity 
2006/07  Alexander Muermann 
Stephen H. Shore 
Strategic Trading and Manipulation with Spot 
Market Power 
2006/06  Jan Pieter Krahnen 
Frank A. Schmid 
Erik Theissen 
Investment Performance and Market Share: A 
Study of the German Mutual Fund Industry 
2006/05  Jan Pieter Krahnen  Die Stabilität von Finanzmärkten: Wie kann die 
Wirtschaftspolitik Vertrauen schaffen? 
2006/04  Jan Pieter Krahnen 
Christian Wilde 
Risk Transfer with CDOs and Systemic Risk in 
Banking 
2006/03  Panos Parpas 
Berc Rustem 
Volker Wieland 
Stan Zakovic 
Mean Variance Optimization of Non–Linear 
Systems and Worst–case Analysis 
2006/02  Christoffer Carroll 
Miles S. Kimball 
Precautionary Saving and Precautionary Wealth 
2006/01  M. Hashem Pesaran  Market Efficiency Today 
2005/33  Fulvio Corsi 
Uta Kretschmer 
Stefan Mittnik 
Christian Pigorsch 
The Volatility of Realized Volatility 
2005/32  Sumit Agarwal 
Souphala Chomsisengphet 
Chunlin Liu 
Nicholas S. Souleles 
Do Consumers Choose the Right Credit Contracts? 
 
Copies of working papers can be downloaded at http://www.ifk-cfs.de  